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TAXATION
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a limited number of
federal taxation cases during the period covered by this survey. This over-
view will provide a brief summary of some of the published cases.'
I. CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS
In Dole,(e v. Urni'ed Stales,2 the issue before the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals was whether the costs of litigation, paid by a corporate taxpayer in
a divorce proceeding, were deductible. The case arose out of suits brought
by Roger Dolese, the Dolese Company (TDC), and Dolese Concrete Com-
pany (DCC) to obtain income tax refunds in the amount of $1.5 million.
3
These suits, in turn, flowed from the divorce proceeding of Roger and Ardith
Dolese. The divorce action began in 1957 and culminated nine years later.
The divorce litigation costs, including $1.3 million in fees and expenses, were
paid by Roger Dolese and the companies.
The divorce petition had named TDC, a company wholly owned by
Roger Dolese, and DCC, a company which in turn was wholly owned by
TDC, as party defendants. Also named as a defendant was the Dolese
Brothers Company, which had been wholly owned by Roger Dolese and
TDC, but was liquidated in 1970 and thereafter operated as a partnership
between Dolese and TDC. In the divorce petition, Dolese was accused "of
threatening to deplete and dissipate the assets of the companies in order to
deprive Ardith of her rights as wife. ' 4 Ardith Dolese sought an order to
prevent Dolese and the companies from engaging in any unusual business
1. Also published were:
United States v. Wase, 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979), in which the Tenth Circuit held that
Congress, not the court of appeals, has the power to declare what is legal tender. The court held
that taxpayers may not value earnings in terms of gold dollars as a means of determining the
need to file an income tax return.
Portland Cement Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980), in which the Tenth
Circuit held that a miner manufacturer's first marketable product was bulk cement. The court
ruled that the expenses associated with bagging the cement could not be considered mining
costs and, therefore, could not be used to reduce the depletion deduction. The United States
Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to determine: 1) if the costs of bags, bagging,
storage, distribution, and sales should be included as nonmining costs, and 2) if bulk cement or
if both bulk and bagged cement constitute the first marketable product for purposes of comput-
ing gross income from mining where the "proportionate profits method" is used. 49 U.S.L.W.
3212 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980) (No. 79-1907).
Stahmann Farms, Inc. v. United States, 624 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1980), in which the Tenth
Circuit held that airplanes, which used only the taxpayer's private landing strip and flew only
over the taxpayer's property, were subject to the "use" tax of I.R.C. § 4491, since the planes
were operated within the statutorily defined navigable airspace.
2. 605 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1647 (1980).
3. The case had been before the Tenth Circuit in 1976. It was remanded to the trial
court, where summary judgment was entered for the United States. See Dolese v. United States,
541 F.2d 853, 854 (10th Cir. 1976).
4. 605 F.2d at 1149.
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activities. Early in the divorce litigation, the court ordered the companies
not to pay investigative expenses. 5 In 1967, Ardith Dolese filed a motion
alleging that her husband was incompetent and requesting that she be ap-
pointed to take his place in the management of the companies. In late 1968,
this motion was denied.
6
Ultimatehy, the state trial coiurt issied orders reniring Dolese and the
three companies each to pay one-fourth of the legal fees and expenses stem-
ming from the divorce action. The state court reasoned that the legal pro-
ceeding was not just a divorce action, but was also a struggle for control of
the companies. TDC and DCC sought to deduct their respective shares of
the litigation expenses and fees as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
7
The United States, however, contended that these payments were actually
constructive dividends paid to Dolese and, as such, were not deductible ex-
penses.
8
The Tenth Circuit court used the "origin of the claim" test to determine
whether the costs of litigation were indeed ordinary and necessary business
expenses. 9 The court of appeals divided the previous litigation into two
categories, finding both a divorce action and an action against the compa-
nies. The court concluded that most of the expenses had their origin in the
divorce action and, therefore, the litigation costs were not deductible.' 0
The Tenth Circuit went on to rule that the costs of obtaining clarifica-
tion of the court order and the costs of resisting the motion to oust Dolese
were deductible. " These expenses were found to have originated in the
business activities of the companies. The court remanded the case to the
trial court for a determination of the deductible amounts. The nondeduct-
ible expenses of litigation, representing "some direct benefit" to Dolese, were
held to be constructive dividends.'
2
The court of appeals also considered whether a series of payments, total-
ling over $150,000, made by the companies to discharge Dolese's personal
debts, were loans or constructive dividends. The Tenth Circuit court noted
that although some loan attributes were present,' 3 the debt was too large to
be liquidated without the sale of one of the companies. Consequently, the
payments were deemed to be constructive dividends.
14
5. Id. By mid-1967, Dolese had spent at least $350,000 investigating Ardith's infidelities
and her children's paternity.
6. Id.
7. I.R.C. § 162(a).
8. 605 F.2d at 1149.
9. "[Tihe origin and character of the claim with respect to which an expense was in-
curred, rather than its potential consequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer, is the control-
ling basic test of whether the expense was 'business' or 'personal' and hence whether it is
deductible or not. ... United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39,49 (1963). Sealso Woodward
v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
10. 605 F.2d at 1151-52.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1152.
13. Id. at 1153. Appellants argued that the advances were loans because "notes were given
, interest was paid, some payments were made on the principal, and the shareholder [Do-
lese] had a balance sheet strong enough to obtain a bank loan sufficient to pay off the entire
loan." Id.
14. Id. at 1154.
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II. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BONDS
The Tenth Circuit, in Kirkpatrck v. United States,' 5 considered whether
the interest derived from bonds issued by the Oklahoma Industries Author-
ity, an agency of the State of Oklahoma, was subject to tax as gross income.
Plaintiff Kirkpatrick purchased $175,000 worth of bonds issued by the
Oklahoma Industries Authority, but did not include the interest from these
bonds as gross income on her 1973 and 1974 income tax returns. The Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue (IRS) assessed deficiencies, which the tax-
payer paid. When her suit for refund was dismissed by the district court, the
taxpayer appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
The money raised by the bond issue was used to construct an office
building which was subsequently leased to Mercy Hospital, a tax-exempt
organization.16 The hospital sublet building space to nonexempt persons.
During 1973 and 1974, approximately six percent of the building was occu-
pied by nonexempt subtenants. By the end of 1977, twenty-nine percent of
the building's total leasable space had been leased to nonexempt subtenants.
The interest on an industrial development bond must be included as
gross income for income tax purposes. 17 There are two tests used to deter-
mine if an obligation is an industrial development bond. To qualify for this
status, both tests must be met. If the major portion of the proceeds of an
obligation "are to be used directly or indirectly in any trade or business car-
ried on by any person who is not an exempt person"' 8 and if a major portion
of the payment of principal and interest of an obligation is secured or de-
rived from a property in a trade or business,' 9 the obligation is an industrial
development bond.
Since the obligations unquestionably met the second test, 20 the court of
appeals looked to see if the requirements of the first test were present. Kirk-
patrick contended that since Mercy Hospital was a tax-exempt entity, the
criterion of the first test was not met. The Tenth Circuit noted that the
intent of the law was to make sure that a tax-exempt entity, such as Mercy
Hospital, would not become a conduit by which nonexempt persons would
benefit from bond proceeds. 2i Therefore, the status of the subtenants was a
determinative factor.
As the subtenants were nonexempt persons, the court looked to see if a
"major portion" of the proceeds were used by these nonexempt persons in
their trade or business. To make this determination, the court relied upon
Treasury Regulation section 1.103-7(b)(3)(iii), which states that "the use of
more than 25 percent of the proceeds of an issue of obligations in the trade or
business of nonexempt persons will constitute the use of a major portion of
such proceeds in such manner."
22
15. 605 F.2d 1160 (10th Cir. 1979).
16. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) provides that hospitals may be exempt from taxation.
17. Id. § 103(b)(1).
18. Id. § 103(b)(2)(A).
19. Id. § 103(b)(2)(B).
20. 605 F.2d at 1162.
21. Id.
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7(b)(3)(iii) (1972).
1981]
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The taxpayer argued that since only six percent of the building was
leased to nonexempt persons in 1973 and 1974, the test was not met for those
years. The court concluded that as nonexempt subtenants occupied twenty-
nine percent of the total leasable space in 1977, there was an indication that
the original intent was to use the building for nonexempt persons. 23 There-
fore, the bonds were declared to be industrial development bonds and the
interest income thereon was deemed taxable.
III. IRS CIVIL SUMMONS
In Untted States v. MacKay,24 the question before the Tenth Circuit was
whether the IRS had abused its civil summons power. 25 In April of 1978, a
criminal investigation of a Mr. and Mrs. Rodgers was initiated by the Crimi-
nal Investigation Division of the IRS, on the basis of information received
from a county sheriff's office and from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The Criminal Investigation Division, asserting that there was a possibility of
unreported income, notified the Audit Division that the investigation should
be conducted jointly.
26
Denied access to the taxpayers' books and records, an IRS agent issued
a summons to the First National Bank of Gillette, Wyoming, requesting the
production of the Rodgers' bank records for 1975, 1976, and 1977. The IRS
agent notified the taxpayers of the summons. As instructed by Mr. and Mrs.
Rodgers, respondent Marshall MacKay, assistant vice president of the bank,
refused to comply with the summons. 27 The IRS sought enforcement of the
summons in district court. When the district court ordered compliance with
the summons, respondent MacKay and Mr. and Mrs. Rodgers, as interven-
ors, appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
28
The respondent contended that the summons was invalid since the IRS
had used its summons powers to pursue an investigation that was strictly
criminal. 2 9 The Tenth Circuit held that the summons was enforceable as it
was issued in good faith 30 prior to any recommendation to the Department
of Justice that a criminal prosecution be undertaken, and because the civil
tax determination had not been abandoned.
3 '
23. 605 F.2d at 1163. Taxability of the interest income is not to be determined yearly by
the fluctuation in the amount of space rented to nonexempt persons.
24. 608 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1979).
25. I.R.C. § 7602.
26. 608 F.2d at 832.
27. Id. at 831.
28. Id.
29. The respondent also contended that the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 barred
the disclosure of the taxpayers' bank records. The court found this argument to be inapplicable
in view of the legislative history and the express and implied provisions of the Act. Id. at 834.
30. In United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), the Supreme Court held that the Com-
missioner need not show probable cause after the ordinary limitations period expired. Instead,
a good faith standard was imposed. Good faith could be shown by establishing that the investi-
gation was for a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry was relevant to the purpose, that the
Commissioner did not already possess the information, and that the proper administrative steps
required by the Code had been taken. The burden of showing abuse was placed on the tax-
payer.




The constructive receipt of interest, which is taxable as income, was
examined by the Tenth Circuit in Estate ofShelton v. Commisszoner.32 In 1970,
the IRS refunded over $150,00033 of improperly assessed taxes and interest
to the Osage Indian Agency, on behalf of the Elkins estate. 34 Because
Shelton, the sole residuary beneficiary of the Elkins estate, had died in 1967,
the Indian Agency advised the co-executors of the Shelton estate that they
had to obtain an additional co-executors' bond before the funds could be
paid to them. The co-executors did not obtain the bond until 1974.
The Commissioner determined that the Shelton estate's gross income
for 1970 should have included that part of the tax refund allocated to inter-
est. 35 The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's decision, but reduced the
amount of the deficiency by twenty percent, the amount withheld by the
Indian Agency to pay the legal fees arising from the litigation to obtain the
original refund.
36
In upholding the Tax Court, the court of appeals found that the agency
had tendered payment to the Shelton estate in 1970, 3 7 and the requirement
that the co-executors obtain an additional bond did not place "substantial
limitations or restrictions" on the right to receive the income. 38 Therefore,
the interest on the tax refund was constructively received by the estate, and
taxable as income, in 1970.
V. TIME FOR ASSESSMENT-THREE YEAR LIMIT
Dowell v. Commissioner3 9 involved taxpayers who had filed fraudulent tax
returns for the years 1963 through 1966 and who, in 1968, filed nonfraudu-
lent amended returns for those years. The government had used the
amended returns in the investigation and prosecution of a fraud case against
the taxpayers.4° The IRS used the amended returns to make a determina-
tion of additional taxes, and to assess penalties and interest due. In late
1974, the IRS advised the taxpayers of deficiencies. The taxpayers peti-
tioned the United States Tax Court, seeking a refund and a bar against any
additional assessment of deficiencies. 4 1 The Tax Court upheld the Commis-
sioner, and the taxpayers appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
32. 612 F.2d 1276 (10th Cir. 1980).
33. Over $92,000 was allocated to interest. Id. at 1278.
34. Mary Jacqueline Elkins was a noncompetent Osage Indian who died in 1932. Id.
35. Id.
36. Estate ofJacqueline E. Shelton, 68 T.C. 15 (1977).
37. The taxpayer had argued that the income should be taxed to the Elkins' estate. The
court noted that I.R.C. § 661(a)(2) provides that an estate can properly deduct any amount
paid or credited to a beneficiary and I.R.C. § 661(a)(2) provides that such amounts are taxable
to the beneficiary. Therefore, even if included in the Elkins' estate, the interest income was
taxable when constructively received by the Shelton estate. 612 F.2d at 1278-79.
38. 612 F.2d at 1279.
39. 614 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1980).
40. Se United States v. Dowell, 446 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1971) (affirming the convictions of
defendants Alfonzo and Vivian Dowell for attempting to evade or defeat federal income taxes).
41. The Tax Court found that the nature of original returns determined the applicable
statute of limitations. Since the original returns were fraudulent, the Commissioner could assess
the tax at any time, according to I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1). The Tax Court found the three year
1981]
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The taxpayers argued that the filing of the amended returns had started
the statute of limitations 42 to run and that, under this accounting, the gov-
ernment had failed to make an assessment within the allotted three year
period. The IRS responded with the argument that, because the original
returns were fraudulent, the assessment against taxpayers could be made at
a" e 4 3 TheTenth Circuit resoe that as t.. amcnidcd filings satisfied
the definition of a return,44 the statute of limitations began to run in 1968.4 5
Accordingly, the judgment of the Tax Court was reversed, and the case was
remanded.
4 6
The government also had contended that because the 1963 and 1964
amended returns were unsigned, the statute of limitations period never be-
gan to run. 4 7 The court concluded that the use of the amended returns in
the fraud action constituted acceptance by the government, and commenced
the running of the statute.
48
VI. Two YEAR LIMIT ON REFUNDS
Snyder v. United Slates49 presented the question of whether a taxpayer is
entitled to obtain a refund of gift taxes which were erroneously paid more
than two years prior to filing of the refund claim. In May of 1973, the IRS
made a jeopardy assessment5 0 against the taxpayer. When no payments
were forthcoming, the IRS began collecting the income from the taxpayer's
rental properties. The assessment was not paid in full until March 1976.
Three months later, the taxpayer filed a claim for refund of the full amount
assessed and collected." The IRS eventually conceded that the assessment
was entirely unfounded, but the Commissioner refused to refund that por-
tion of the assessment not paid within two years of the first claim for re-
general statute of limitations provided in I.R.C. § 6501(a) to be inapplicable. Dowell v. Com-
missioner, 68 T.C. 646 (1977).
42. "Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of any tax imposed by this
title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed ..... " .ROC. § 6501(a).
43. "In the case of a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax, the tax may be
assessed, . . . at any time." I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1).
44. "Perfect accuracy or completeness is not necessary to rescue a return from nullity, if it
purports to be a return, is sworn to as such . . . , and evinces an honest and genuine endeavor
to satisfy the law. This is so though at the time of filing the omissions or inaccuracies are such as
to make amendment necessary." 614 F.2d at 1265 (quoting Zellerbach Paper Co. v, Helvering,
293 U.S. 172, 180 (1934)).
45. I.R.C. § 6501(a). The court noted that the "at any time" provision of I.R.C.
§ 6501(c)(1) is necessary to give the government ample time to uncover information which the
taxpayer fails to provide. But once the taxpayer provides the government with the necessary
information, the three year statute takes over.
46. 614 F.2d at 1267.
47. Id. at 1266. See Kalb v. United States, 505 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1974); Doll v. Commis-
sioner, 358 F.2d 713 (3d Cir. 1966).
48. 614 F.2d at 1267.
49. 616 F.2d 1187 (10th Cir. 1980).
50. If the Secretary believes that the assessment or collection of a deficiency, as de-
fined in section 6211, will be jeopardized by delay, he shall, notwithstanding the provi-
sions of section 6213(a), immediately assess such deficiency (together with all interest,
additional amounts, and additions to the tax provided for by law), and notice and
demand shall be made by the Secretary for the payment thereof.
I.R.C. § 6861(a).
51. 616 F.2d at 1187.
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fund. 52 The taxpayer initiated a suit in district court contesting the IRS
disallowance, The taxpayer was granted a summary judgment.5 3 The IRS
appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In reversing the decision of the district court,54 the Tenth Circuit court
relied on Internal Revenue Code section 6511(b)(2)(B) which states that
"the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax
paid during the 2 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim." The
court noted that this provision had been consistently interpreted to mean
that the taxpayer's recovery was limited to the amounts paid within two
years of bringing suit. 55 The court reasoned that any other construction
would allow a taxpayer to extend the time for filing a claim by making small
periodic payments.5 6 The taxpayer asserted that a strict reading of the Code
results in a hardship on a taxpayer who is unable to pay an assessment
within two years. The court answered that an alternative remedy was avail-
able. A taxpayer may petition the United States Tax Court for a redetermi-
nation of the assessment prior to making any payment.
57
VII. PENALTY UNDER SECTION 6672 OR 3505
In Fidehly Bank v. Unied States,58 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court for improperly instructing the jury that the govern-
ment bore the risk of nonpersuasion in the action below. The case arose
when a bank sought a refund of penalties assessed in accordance with section
6672 of the Internal Revenue Code. 59 In 1971, CDI Homes, Inc. (CDI) had
obtained a one million dollar revolving credit line from Fidelity Bank, N.A.
(Fidelity). By 1973, CDI had overdrawn its credit line and had ceased oper-
ations. Fidelity had agreed to permit CDI to overdraw its account, but Fi-
delity reserved the right to examine and approve each overdraft.
Checks clearly marked with the word "payroll" were among those ap-
proved by Fidelity in 1973. These payroll checks included gross wages, less
income taxes and FICA taxes which had been withheld. CDI had no other
source of funds and relied on Fidelity to honor checks for the amount of the
52. The IRS relied on I.R.C. § 6511(a), which states that a
claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title in respect
of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed by the taxpayer
within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was
paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed by the tax-
payer, within 2 years from the time the tax was paid.
53. The district court held that the two year period of limitation of I.R.C. § 6511 (a) did
not begin to run until all of the assessment had been collected. 616 F.2d at 1188.
54. Id. at 1189-90.
55. Id. at 1188.
56. Id.
57. Id See also I.R.C. § 6213.
58. 616 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1980).
59. Section 6672(a) provides: Any person required to collect, truthfully account for,
and pay over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or
truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to
evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penal-
ties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of tax evaded, or
not collected, or not accounted for and paid over. No penalty shall be imposed under




withholdings. 60 On June 26, 1973, Fidelity dishonored CDI checks which
had been presented through normal banking channels on June 25. The dis-
honored checks included one for the withholdings of the second quarter of
1973. In late June, the bank commenced the liquidation of the company.
Fidelity used the proceeds of subsequent sales to pay wages and to reduce
CDI's overdrawn account. Taxes were withheld from the wages, but the
taxes were not paid to the IRS.
6 1
The Commissioner assessed a one hundred percent penalty against Fi-
delity.62 Although Fidelity paid a portion of the assessment,63 the bank sub-
sequently brought suit for refund. The Commissioner counterclaimed,
demanding payment of the unpaid balance of the penalty and payment of
the taxes due and owing. The IRS counterclaim was based upon section
3505(b) of the Code. 64 The trial court found for Fidelity, and the govern-
ment appealed.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that each overdraft consti-
tuted a separate loan to CDI. The court asserted that since the checks were
clearly marked "payroll," Fidelity must have known that it was providing
funds for wages. 65 The court reasoned that Fidelity also must have known
that CDI could not make a timely payment or deposit to cover the taxes.
Furthermore, after CDI's closure, Fidelity controlled CDI's income.66 The
appellate court concluded that Fidelity was clearly liable for the unpaid tax
under section 3505(b). The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for a determi-
nation of the exact amount of penalty to be imposed. 67 As to the govern-
ment's original claim under section 6672, the Tenth Circuit court found that
the jury properly could have concluded that Fidelity was not a responsible
person. 68 Nevertheless, because the jury had been improperly told that the
government bore the risk of nonpersuasion, the case was remanded on the
section 6672 issue as well.
69
Leah Amer Harmony
60. 616 F.2d at 1183.
61. Id. at 1184.
62. Id. at 1182.
63. Normally, the taxpayer must pay the full tax or penalty before bringing suit in district
court. To challenge a penalty under I.R.C. § 6672, however, the taxpayer need pay only one
employee's taxes.
64. Section 3505(b) provides: If a lender, surety, or other person supplies funds to or
for the account of an employer for the specific purposes of paying wages of the employ-
ees of such employer, with actual notice or knowledge (within the meaning of section
6323(i)(1)) that such employer does not intend to or will not be able to make timely
payment or deposit of the amounts of tax required by this subtitle to be deducted and
withheld by such employer from such wages, such lender, surety, or other person shall
be liable in his own person and estate to the United States in a sum equal to the taxes
(together with interest) which are not paid over to the United States by such employer
with respect to such wages. However, the liability of such lender, surety, or other
person shall be limited to an amount equal to 25 percent of the amount so supplied to
or for the account of such employer for such purpose.
I.R.C. § 3505(b).
65. 616 F.2d at 1184.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1185.
68. Id. at 1186.
69. d.
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